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BASEL NORMS COMPLIANCE IN INDIA: ISSUES AND CONCERNS 
Abstract 
The recurrence of financial crises in the world prompted Group of 10 countries (G – 10) to form 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) of Bank of International Standards.  The 
BCBS proposed a Basel accord in 1988 which was adopted in April 1994 in India. Gradually, 
India implemented Basel – II and Basel – III norms in 2009 and 2013 respectively. The global 
financial crisis necessitated the need for strengthening banks all over the world by creating an 
extensive regulatory framework for computing Credit to Risk weighted Asset Ratio (CRAR) 
taking into consideration credit market and operational risks. Indian Banks have been following 
Basel – III norms since 2013 and full compliance will be achieved by 31st March, 2019. The 
stringent capital adequacy requirements have posed various challenges for the Indian Banks. Full 
compliance of these new norms will increase Indian banks’ capital needs by $20 billion to $30 
billion. Various studies on implementation of Basel norms have revealed that these standards 
have been formulated taking into account Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development countries than developing countries. The banks especially in developing countries 
may face a sharp decline in their return on capital (ROA) due to these new norms. India is 
finding itself at crossroads, balancing to achieve social objectives of financial inclusion and 
creating a resilient financial system to absorb financial shocks. The objective of this paper is to 
study the implementation of Basel standards from 1994 onwards in phases from Basel – I to 
Basel – III and the challenges faced in the process.    
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BASEL NORMS COMPLIANCE IN INDIA: ISSUES AND CONCERNS  
1. Introduction 
The international financial system has undergone a considerable change since the crash of the 
IMF system of determining exchange rates. All countries in the world have their own exchange 
rate determination mechanisms. In such a scenario the trading partners have to rely on a robust 
financial infrastructure, domestic as well as international, to facilitate international transactions. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) of Bank of International Standards (BIS) 
developed a mechanism in 1988 known as Basel Standards for developing a robust and resilient 
banking system for smooth settlement of international transactions.  
Recurrent financial crises in various parts of the world necessitated innovation of strategies 
which could bolster their financial systems to avoid them. In 1974, Bank of Herstatt in Germany 
was liquidated over delay in payments in New York due to difference in time zones. This 
incident exhorted G-10 countries to form BCBS under the BIS. In 1988, BCBS introduced risk-
based capital adequacy norms through Basel – I accord. The accord focussed mainly on credit 
risk and classified a bank’s assets into five groups on the basis of risk weight assigned to each 
asset. The Government held debts (Government securities) were assigned zero risk while other 
assets of banks such as borrowings by banks were given 20% risk. Loans and advances to others 
by banks were apportioned 50% risk. The banks were advised to hold capital equal to 8% of risk 
weighted assets. This paper attempts to study the intricacies of Basel standards for the banking 
system, its implementation and impact on capital requirements, liquidity and profitability of 
India banks. 
2. Objectives 
The main objectives of this study are: 
i. To study the evolution of Basel standards for banking system 
ii. To elucidate the transition of Indian banks in embracing Basel – I to Basel – III standards  
iii. To examine the impact of Basel norms on the banking system in India 
3. Research Methodology 
This study is based on secondary sources of data such as research reports, working papers of 
scholars from prestigious institutions, books and journal articles. An attempt has been made to 
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study the intricacies of Basel standards developed by the BCBS of BIS and implemented by 
various countries all over the world, including India. A summarised analysis of these studies has 
been presented in this paper in a lucid and comprehensive manner. 
4. Literature Review 
Griffith Jones (2002) has shown empirically that Basel – II standards may overestimate the risk 
of lending to developing countries. Thus implementing these standards may be detrimental to the 
development of their banking system. 
Griffith Jones (2003) and Kings et al (2003) and Kraussl (2003) have argued that Basel – I norms 
lack representation by developing countries. The risk weights for credit risks of international 
lending are in favour of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries. 
 Bordoloi (2003) asserts that Basel standards necessitate the need to upgrade risk management 
skills of their staff and undertake massive investments. 
Allen et al (2012) believe that the real challenge in implementing Basel – III standards lies in 
“ensuring a coordinated adoption” across the breadth of financial entities.  
Jayadev (2013) has drawn attention to the fact that banks need to change their perceptions about 
risk management functions from mere compliance to building a robust financial institution. 
Shah (2013) has also raised concerns about a fall in ROE while implementing Basel – III norms. 
These studies point out various concerns about implementing Basel standards such as raising 
capital, risk management, upgradation of skills of staff in banks, decline in returns on equity and 
assets etc. but with appropriate safeguards set in place Basel norms can strengthen financial 
system all over the world. 
5. Basel – I Norms in India 
Basel – I standards were adopted in India in April, 1994. To determine CRAR banks’ capital is 
divided into two categories – core capital (Tier – I) and supplementary (TIER – II) capital. Tier – 
I capital comprises equity capital and undisclosed reserves. Tier – II capital includes undisclosed 
reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions/general loan-loss reserves, hybrid debt capital 
instruments and subordinated term debt. Basel – I stipulates that at least 50% of banks’ capital 
should be core capital.   
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In 1996, in addition to ‘credit risk’ ‘market risk’ was added with an amendment to Basel – I 
accord to calculate CRAR. To measure market risk banks were given two options. One, they 
could choose a standardised approach using building block methodology, and two, they could 
adopt an ‘in-house’ approach which allows banks to develop their own propriety models to 
calculate capital charge for market risk by using the notion of value-at-risk. These methodologies 
calculate capital charges for market risk and not for risk weighted assets. To compute credit risk, 
risk weighted assets have to be multiplied with 12.5 (reciprocal of 8%, the minimum capital 
adequacy norm) and then added to the risk weighted assets to arrive at credit risk. To compute 
CRAR, the numerator will be the sum of the bank’s tier I and tier II capital (tier II capital should 
be limited to a maximum of 100% of tier I capital), plus a tier III capital introduced in the 1996 
amendment to support market risk. 
6. Basel – II Norms 
Basel – II was conceived after the banking crisis in 1990 and due to criticism of Basel – I on 
many counts. In 1991 the Basel Committee proposed a new accord known as a ‘Revised 
Framework on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards known 
as Basel – II. The new framework was designed to improve regulatory capital requirements and 
signal the underlying risks posed by the financial innovations. Basel – II accord was published in 
June 2004. A survey conducted in 2007 by Financial Stability Institute of BIS reveals that 82 
countries intended to adopt Basel – II norms by 2015. India adopted Basel – II norms in 2009. 
Basel–II accord is a comprehensive framework of banking supervision incorporating supervisory 
review and market discipline. It is based on three pillars – Pillar 1 refers to minimum regulatory 
requirement. It is an extensive regulatory framework for computing CRAR taking into 
consideration credit market and operational risks.  
Pillar 2 relates to supervisory review that provides key principles of supervisory review. It 
encompasses risk management guidance and supervisory transparency and accountability. 
Computation of the Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) of a bank involves three methodologies – the 
Standardised Approach (SA) and two Internal Rating Based (IRB) approaches. The SA requires 
banks to use credit ratings from external agencies to compute capital adequacy requirement 
commensurate with the level of risk. The two IRB approaches are – the Foundation IRB (FIRB) 
and Advanced IRB (AIRB). The FIRB allows banks to ascertain risk weights of their assets as 
per their internal models (Shenoy et al 2013). However, the regulator provides model 
assumptions for loss given default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD) and effective maturity 
(M). Advanced IRB is the same as FIRB except that a bank is free to set assumptions of LGD, 
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EAD and M in the model. IRB is a self-regulatory mechanism which benefits both, the regulators 
and banks.    
Pillar 3 is represented by market discipline. This pillar encourages market discipline by 
developing a set of disclosure requirements that will allow market participants to assess key 
pieces of information on risk exposure, risk assessment process and capital adequacy of a bank.   
The financial crisis of 2007-08 exposed the inadequacy of Basel – II to check financial 
irregularities. Hence in 2009 amendments were made in Basel – II to make it more robust with 
the following revisions: 
a) Augmenting the value-at-risk based trading book framework with an additional charge 
for risk capital, including mitigation risk and default risk.  
b) Addition of stressed value-at-risk condition. This condition takes into account probability 
of significant losses over a period of one year.  
The implementation date was set at 31st December, 2010. However these revisions were included 
in Basel – III later by the BCBS in 2012. 
It is true that Basel norms have been designed to strengthen capital base of banks and improve 
the supervisory regime but critics are of the opinion that these norms lack representation of 
developing countries (Griffith-Jones 2003; King et al 2003; Kraussl 2003). These norms are 
biased in favour of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries. Basel – II norms have done away with the distinction between OECD and non-OECD 
countries and the risk weights are based on risk assessment of the country. Countries can decide 
between risk assessment rating given by the private sector risk assessors such as Standard and 
Poor, Moody’s and Fitch, or using the country risk scores given by the export credit agencies 
recognised by the national supervisor of the country.  
The removal of distinction between OECD and non-OECD countries is a welcome move but risk 
assessment of a country by a credit rating agency may inhibit a developing country’s chances of 
accessing capital from abroad. Also, risk assessment of a country by a credit rating agency is 
pro-cyclical and a developing country may suffer a poor rating at turbulent times when raising 
capital to overcome a difficult economic situation is imperative (Ferri et al 1999; Monfort and 
Mulder 2000). An empirical study by Griffith and Jones et al (2002) has revealed that Basel – II 
have significantly overestimated the risk of international lending to developing countries. During 
the East Asian crisis of 1997-98, capital flow to East Asian countries – Indonesia, South Korea 
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and Thailand declined sharply due to down gradation of sovereign ratings by Moody’s and 
worsened the crisis (Ferri et al, 2000). 
7. Basel – III Norms and Indian Banks 
Basel – III accord was introduced in response to the global financial crisis in 2007. The revisions 
incorporated in Basel – II in 2009 led to an increase in the minimum common equity requirement 
from 2% to 4.5%. In addition, the banks are required to hold a capital conservation buffer of 
2.5% to withstand future periods of stress leading to 7% minimum equity requirement. There are 
valid fears among bankers that Basel – III norms may affect Indian banks adversely. Critics are 
of the opinion that Basel – III norms were chalked out for G-10 countries. For developing 
countries the norms are too stringent and would affect achievement of their social objectives 
such as escalation of financial inclusion.  
The implementation of Basel – III norms in India commenced from 1st April, 2013 and full 
compliance is expected to be achieved by 31st March, 2019. It would be beneficial for Indian 
banks as they would be able to compete globally by becoming Basel – III compliant. However, 
additional capital requirements would pose various problems for banks already struggling to 
manage a high amount of NPAs. 
Total minimum capital requirements by the Indian banks as per Basel – III norms would be 
11.5% (minimum total capital ratio of 9% plus capital conservation buffer of 2.5%). These new 
norms increase Indian banks’ capital needs by $20 billion to $30 billion. The banks may face a 
sharp decline in their return on capital (ROA) due to these new norms.  
Table 1: Calibration of Capital Requirements of Basel – III  
Capital requirement/Buffer  Common Equity Tier 1 (%) Tier 1 Capital (%) Total Capital (%) 
Minimum 4.5 6.0 8.0 
Conservation Buffer 2.5 - - 
Minimum plus Conservation 
Buffer 
7.0 8.5 10.5 
Counter cyclical Buffer 
Range 
0 – 2.5 - - 
Source: Basel – III Accord, 2011 Revision 
For the Indian banks, meeting the stringent capital requirements of Basel – III norms is a huge 
challenge. Many of the public sector banks are having a large amount of distress assets and 
raising capital from the market would be very difficult for them. A research report by Credit 
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Suisse reveals that Basel – III compliance would push up capital needs of Indian banks by $20 
billion to $30 billion (one lakh crore to 1.5 lakh crores). It will be difficult for banks to remain 
profitable as increased capital requirement to do the same amount of business would reduce their 
return on assets (ROA). The incremental equity requirements of banks would increase by Rs.3.2 
to 4 trillion in the forthcoming six years. Basel – III norms compliance in a period when many of 
the public sector banks are having a large amount of NPAs would further put pressure on them to 
provide for bad loans. For every 1% increase in gross NPAs the banking system would require 
Rs.25000 crores (Jain, Mukul 2013). 
In spite of these concerns, Basel – III compliance would make Indian banks resilient and 
globally competent. Features like wider risk coverage, counter cyclical capital requirement, 
enhanced liquidity, creation of buffer at good times and prevention of bad debts would 
strengthen Indian banks and place them on International pedestal.  
8. Conclusion 
Introduction of uniform banking standards by BCBS for banks all over the world facilitates 
international monetary transactions. The gradual transition from Basel – I to Basel – II and 
further to Basel – III standards in banking has posed various difficulties for Indian banks which 
are at present stressed with high NPAs and finding it difficult to remain liquid as well as 
profitable. Nevertheless, compliance to these norms would lead to a resilient banking system 
which is required at a time when the countries in the world are so closely inter-connected with 
each other that the news of distress in one economy spreads to other parts of the world with 
lightning speed due to advancement of technology. The Indian banks may find it difficult to meet 
stringent capital requirements of Basel – III but proactive steps taken by them to reduce their 
NPAs and streamlining of their operative costs would definitely enable them to meet the 
international banking standards.  
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